This open issue reflects PhaenEx's commitment to interdisciplinary work across the traditions and its emphasis on existential and phenomenological descriptions of life, historicity, and intersubjectivity. This variety opens up a space for a meaningful arrangement: as in a musical composition, the essays published in this edition resonate and invite the reader to hear a melody of thoughts, a variation on a common theme. They reflect a shared concern for questions related to the status of lived interpretation and embodied expression in their relations to time, materiality, and social and historical contexts.
Our first essay invites the reader to "dance with Schopenhauer." Reflecting on the philosopher's silence about the aesthetics of dance, Joshua Hall sheds new light on Schopenhauer's conception of dance performance by portraying it as the very shadow of his thought. Hall delves into Schopenhauer's theory of the will in order to elucidate the status of embodied expression and its role in social interactions and individual flourishing. Contrasting Schopenhauer's arguments with Plato's suggestions in the Laws, the author argues that dance should ultimately be the "art of the objectification of the will, and even a potentially viable route to the salvation of the world-a Nietzschean salvation of joyful affirmation." This provocative statement means to uncover the status of embodied expression in Schopenhauer's philosophy.
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Matthew T. Nowachek similarly refers to technological artefacts, namely robots, in
order to reveal what makes us human: that is, our ability to interpret the world in a given social context. Nowachek works out a radically innovative critique of race theory and identity by contrasting the predominantly Cartesian ontology assumed by the philosophy of technology, with the phenomenological conception of the subject as embodied and immersed in a world that is always already there. This illuminating comparison stresses the inadequacy of the strictly naturalist and poststructuralist definitions of race. What makes us human is our ability to grow out of sedimented meanings. In order to understand and deconstruct race we must understand why we are not machines, and why we appropriate thereby our very responsibility.
Keith Whitmoyer returns to Merleau-Ponty's analysis of time in The Phenomenology of Perception in order to provide a renewed account of the phenomenologist's description of the "past that has never been present." He argues that Merleau-Ponty's understanding of time departs from Husserl's notion of Zeitbewusstsein and makes room for a temporal understanding of the -iiiÉlodie Boublil & Martine Béland prereflective level that exceeds its manifestation, and our ability to grasp it, in the present. Like a shadow, "this silence is the field of non-presence, non-sense, and the mute fund on which the field of presence draws for its manifestation." Rather than attempting to interpret the tension between the apparent primacy of the present and immemorial past within the framework of an ontological "turn" in Merleau-Ponty's work, this essay seeks to contextualize this reference to an immemorial past in 1945. According to Whitmoyer, the concept of an "immemorial past," in its We are grateful to our authors for submitting their manuscripts to PhaenEx, and we express our gratitude to all who helped make this open issue possible: the many reviewers who thoroughly read and commented on the submitted essays, the publishers who sent us review copies, the Montreal photographer Robin Cerutti who permitted us to publish "Union Boy" on our cover page, and the collaborators who proofread the papers. Bonne lecture à tous!
